*{BRIDGING EUROPE - New Dialogue across Europe BACKGROUND ANALYSIS [http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Bridging_Europe/Bridging_Europe_background_analysis.pdf]

By World Economic Forum and the House of Mandag Morgen

JUNE 2001}

*partie=titre 1. European Challenges for the Future *partie=nil

*partie=titre 1.1 The Challenge of Euroscepticism *partie=nil

Over the past 15 years, integration and cooperation between the countries of Western Europe has created economic growth, millions of jobs and stability – both economic and in terms of inter-country relations. Any other initiator of such a string of success stories would be viewed favourably by history. However, this is not the case for European cooperation and the institutions that make it function.

On the contrary, the European Union has never been as unpopular as it is today. Public criticism and scepticism towards the EU are increasing dramatically. The political support for European cooperation is waning and there is a growing feeling of European disintegration and fragmentation.

There are many examples of the people’s rejection of the European project. The most recent were both the violent and, more interestingly, the peaceful demonstrations in Gothenburg as well as the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty. 529,478 ‘no’ voters could end up having an enormous impact, not only on the 376 million Europeans in the present member states of the European Union, but even more on the 100 million citizens of the candidate countries. *{1} 

*{1 www.referendum.ie}

The increasing Euroscepticism is dramatic because it is taking place at a time when there is a growing need for stronger and more effective European cooperation. The Union is about to take in ten or more new members. At the same time many challenges offered by globalisation can no longer be handled nationally but require common European answers. Disintegration or even just stagnation of European cooperation in this situation could have dramatic effects, both on the European economy and on the political stability of the whole continent.

Even when it is seen in isolation, the risk of losing support for the planned enlargement of the European Union gives an idea of how much is at stake. A recent report from The European Round Table of Industrialists estimates that the GDP gains from enlargement will be substantially above 10 billion euros for the present 15 EU countries and some 50 billion euros for the candidate countries.*{2} All or parts of these economic gains could be lost. To avoid such effects it is necessary to take Euroscepticism seriously and to start dealing with it in new ways. 

*{2 European Round Table of Industrialists, 2001}

*partie=titre 1.2. The Causes of Euroscepticism *partie=nil

Euroscepticism is a fact. For example, support for EU-membership in the present 15 member states has fallen more than 20 points over the past ten years. Today it stands at below 50%. *{(See Figure 1 on page 10.)}

Also in the Central and Eastern European countries, scepticism towards the EU is significant. In order to deal with euroscepticism we must first ask why people are sceptical of the European Union? Nobody knows the exact answer to this question. There is no detailed research on the reasons for Euroscepticism. But it is fair to assume that each of the following elements contributes to the negative public opinion:

The democratic deficit. 43% of Europeans say they are not very or not at all satisfied with democracy in the EU.*{3} Despite several institutional changes, such as increasing the influence of the directly elected European Parliament, this is a picture which has not changed. The citizens still tend to see the Union as undemocratic and bureaucratic. 

*{3 Eurobarometer 54, April 2001}

A lack of transparency. The structure of the European Union seems very difficult to comprehend. Its institutions function
differently from those national institutions that are familiar to their citizens. Deliberations in the institutions take place behind closed doors, in a foreign language and often with the use of specialised jargon.

A lack of dialogue with the citizens. No member state of the EU has an on-going broad debate on European affairs. Politicians, researchers and the media seem to be those who are continuously discussing European issues. Discussions involving a broader public seem to occur only in connection with events like referenda, EU-presidencies, EU-summits etc., in other words at times when the climate for discussion is often heated and loaded with confrontation – not dialogue. 

These are some factors leading to increasing Euroscepticism. National disparities, economic worries, educational level and social status, as well as political preferences and opposition against European integration, are other factors accounting for the complex faces of and reasons for widespread Euroscepticism. Regardless of the reasons for public scepticism towards the EU, this challenge has to be taken seriously by all stakeholders in European public and private sectors.

*partie=titre 1.3 The Consequences of Euroscepticism *partie=nil

Just as nobody can tell the exact cause of Euroscepticism, nobody can tell the exact price of not dealing with it. However, there is no doubt that the price of passivity is high:

Slower enlargement process. There is a fear that Euroscepticism slows down the integration of the applicant countries into the EU. A lack of political will and courage to make the necessary compromise due to fear of public reaction could prolong negotiations and harden positions. Euroscepticism could even lead to one or more candidate countries rejecting membership. For example 53% of Estonians say they would vote against joining the EU and only 36% would say yes to membership. *{4} 

*{4 www.euobserver.com}

Losing out on the global scene. Common European answers to the challenges of globalisation demand strong European institutions. Weak institutions would mean problems defining common European positions and afterwards defending them on the global scene.

Disintegration or fragmentation. Risks could arise of losing European solidarity and unity, where all countries participate fully in the whole of the integration process, accepting both the rights and duties that follow from membership. Such a development is already taking place in Denmark, Sweden and Britain.

*{In part 2, a closer look at Euroscepticism will follow.}

*partie=titre 2. Euroscepticism and its Many Facets *partie=nil

*partie=titre 2.1 In Search of Euroscepticism *partie=nil

What is Euroscepticism? Is a Eurosceptic somebody who is against scrapping her national currency for the euro? Is it necessary to be against the EU institutions to be categorised as a Eurosceptic? Is a Eurosceptic somebody who is critical of enlargement because it will decrease his own country’s benefits from membership? Nobody knows. Little research has been devoted to painting a picture of Euroscepticism and its causes. This means that little or no comparative data is available for an in-depth analysis of Euroscepticism.

Some of the existing research, though, points in different directions, which makes it even more difficult to extract the essence of the problem. The following is an attempt to uncover and categorise the different types of public resistance to the EU. This way, we will end up with a better understanding of the phenomenon. *{(See Figure 2.)}

In general, some of the obvious worries about the EU are connected to the democratic deficit, the lack of transparency in the decision making process, the difficulties in influencing the system and the fear of Europe developing into a superpower. Some of these worries are a mixture of different factors, myths and realities of the EU.

The following categories of economic, political and cultural arguments related to Euroscepticism have been defined as popular statements.

*partie=titre 2.2 Political Arguments *partie=nil

*partie=titre “The EU has a democratic deficit” *partie=nil

This argument deals with the perception of a political EU-system, which is not considered fully democratic. The same could be said about other international organisations like the Council of Europe, the UN, IMF, The World Bank etc. One factor, however, differentiates the EU from all other international organizations, increasing public demand and expectations that the Union should work democratically. That is the EU´s role as a national legislator.

Since the Union decides what colorants and additives are allowed in baby food, what rules apply to television commercials for children etc., decisions from Brussels become extremely important for all citizens in their daily lives. A person who is allergic to certain substances expects to be able to contact the national authorities to express her opinion on, for example, the labels on products, since their contents affect her life every day. However, when decisions are taken by the EU, many citizens refrain from action. They simply give up. The EU is seen by many people as a system with few or no possibilities for citizens to engage in direct dialogue with the authorities. The EU lacks traditional channels through which the citizens can express their disagreement or sentiments. Furthermore, for the majority of European citizens the institutions are situated in a foreign country.

Different types of criticism of the EU system have been voiced. Sometimes the various arguments used against the EU might even be contradictory. Decisions are said to be taken behind closed doors. Some consider it undemocratic that the Council of Ministers can take decisions by qualified majority. Others complain of the lack of efficiency when the Union is supposed to take decisions.

Some argue that instruments well known from national and local decision making bodies are not recognised in the EU decisionmaking process and that if only the European Parliament had the same functionality as national parliaments, the EU would automatically become more democratic.

Others argue that only national parliaments can meet the needs of the citizens with regard to democratic dialogue and legitimacy. Those who argue that national parliaments are the only legitimate body for legislative decisions will always remain sceptical of the EU with the current institutional design. Still it would be both important and interesting to engage in a dialogue to get a picture of what can be considered as a democratic relationship between countries.

Political legitimacy comes from the people, as it does in national democracies. And when looking to the EU you can say that the Union’s experience of popular support has been mixed. Treaties have been rejected in referendums in Denmark and Ireland. Participation in elections to the European Parliament is low and falling. Different traditions and historical developments in the nations provide some of the explanation to the falling tendency among the citizens to use their democratic right in national and in EP elections. But it can also be viewed as mistrust towards the political systems. Displeasure with national political systems can very well be thought to influence voting behaviour when it comes to EP elections. When one theme in the French referendum on the Maastricht-treaty 1992 was that a ‘no’ to Maastricht also was a ‘no’ to president Mitterand, it becomes difficult to judge the reason for the 49% ‘no’ vote.

Paradoxically, participation in elections to the European Parliament has decreased while the parliament has actually gained more and more influence in the European decision-making system. But experience from the parliament election campaigns shows that respect for the parliament is limited and that old catch-phrases,like Margaret Thatcher’s characterisation of the institution as a “Mickey Mouse parliament,” are still alive and kicking.

When the European Parliament is ridiculed in public debate, the only EU-institution with a name recognisable from a vocabulary of national democracy is being discredited. Such a situation must lead to discontent with the democratic situation within the EU. Figures show that the voters in countries like Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, The Netherlands, and Germany especially, are unsatisfied with the “European version” of democracy. In Germany, participation in EP elections has decreased by almost 20 points since 1979. Great Britain is the black sheep in the EU family, with only 24% of the population voting in the last EP election in 1999. *{(See Figure 3.)}

*partie=titre “The EU is only for the élite” *partie=nil

In 1993, the former President of the European Commission Jacques Delors stated that: “Europe began as an élitist project [in which it was believed] that all that was required was to convince the decision-makers. That phase of benign despotism is now over” *{5} 

*{5 Jaques Delors in The Independent, 26th July 1993}

Is this period over or is the EU primarily a project for the enlightened élite? To many citizens, the European project is seen as centralised and far from the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Initiatives for the gradual development of European cooperation from coal and steel to a single currency, common foreign and security policy etc. have always come from the top with the élite of society as the most dominant source of influence.

The gap between the élite in politics, business, interest organisations, and the media and, on the other side, the citizens, has become wide. The statistics seem to support this pattern. Across the EU member states, popular support for the EU is highest among the élite and white collar workers. Conversely, it is lowest among manual workers. 63% of European managers support their country’s EU membership, whereas only 44% of manual workers do so. *{(See Figure 4.)}

Although the different groups do not necessarily share the same motive for their support or rejection of the EU, this picture is clear in all the member countries. Thus, Euroscepticism is related to social stratification in Europe.

*partie=titre “EU decides too much” *partie=nil

This argument has many facets. It is a question of which policies the EU is dealing with and to what extent it influences national legislation.

One source of dissatisfaction arises from EU decisions being over-detailed. The popular protests against EU are often directed towards very specific EU-decisions, for example farmers, who protest against changes in the agriculture policy or fishermen, critical of EU fishing quotas. In some cases, the public protest is mainly a question of dissatisfaction with the specific policy decisions rather than an expression of dissatisfaction with the fact that the decisions have been made by EU institutions. In other cases, the resistance is based on arguments about over-regulation.

Has bureaucracy in Brussels gone too far, when the EU issues recommendations governing the appearance of emergency exit signs and their location in hotels or when the British butcher breaks the law by using pounds and ounces instead of the metric system? Interestingly, 42% of EU citizens want the EU to play the same or a less important role in their daily life in the future. *{(See Figure 5.)}

Another area of concern is the fact that EU-decisions affect increasing numbers of policy areas. The number of policy areas where the EU has a say, has grown significantly since the 1950’s, when the EEC dealt with ensuring peace, negotiating coal and steel tariffs and defining a common agricultural policy.

In Nice, the politicians agreed on an agenda for combating poverty and social exclusion. But people could ask, “Is this really a task for the EU or is it a matter for the country to decide on its own?” Preferences concerning which policy areas the EU should cover vary substantially across Europe. *{(See Figure 6 on page 16.)}

*partie=titre “I don’t want Europe to become a Superpower” *partie=nil

Another anti-EU argument is based on resistance to a “United States of Europe”. This resistance means opposition to the EU exercising competence in policy areas traditionally seen as national icons, for example defence, currency and police matters. *{(See Figure 7.)} The recent development meansthat many people could ask themselves “Is the EU developing into a United States of Europe or a Superpower? And were we ever asked if that was what we wanted?”

The Maastricht Treaty brought to the European populations a single currency, the prospects of a common defence policy and the start of European police cooperation. Three national symbols were launched in this treaty, which changed the focus of the EEC from economic cooperation to political cooperation and gave it a new name: The European Union. Three countries held referendums. In France only a small majority voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty and in a Danish referendum a majority, consisting of 50.7% of the voters, rejected the treaty.

The opposition to the euro follows the same arguments. In Germany, only 47% are in favour of the common currency, while Sweden and the United Kingdom choose not to join the euro yet. Opinion polls today show that referendums on the euro in these two countries would end like the Danish referendum in September 2000, where 53.2% voted against the euro.

*partie=titre 2. 3 Economic Arguments *partie=nil

*partie=titre “I don’t benefit from my country’s membership of the EU” *partie=nil

One source of legitimacy is the union’s ability to deliver economic results and increased welfare to its citizens. Analyses of the development of people’s attitudes to the EU conclude that individuals’ attitudes towards EU-membership are consistent with their occupation-based economic interests. Skilled and unskilled workers’ interests are influenced differently, depending on their nationality and their competitiveness in the liberalised market. According to this, if micro-economic integration works well and delivers benefits, more people will support EU-membership. *{6} 

*{6 M. Gabel, 1998}

However, other research shows that optimism about the coming year, left-right orientation, education and satisfaction with life in general are more closely associated with EU support than income, class or unemployment. *{7} 

*{7 A. Bosch & K. Newton, 1995.}

*partie=titre “As a rich country we don’t benefit enough from EU-membership” *partie=nil

If individual economic benefit does not have a clear impact on attitudes towards the EU, it is possible that the country’s benefit plays a role in the evaluation of membership. On the one hand, Figure 8 shows the falling perception of national economic benefit from the EU. Other research, however, shows that Europeans did not vary their support according to their country’s share of the Brussels budget. What did play a role, though, was the general national economic performance. *{8} This might be a sign of the influence of national political performance on attitudes towards the EU. 

*{8 R. C. Eichenberg & R. J. Dalton,1993}

The dilemma lies in the fact that it is possible to make direct calculations of how much a country pays to the EU budget and how much money goes back from Brussels to that country. It is not possible however, to show as clearly what the other benefits from EU membership are.

Apparently, the myth of an individual and national “cost-benefit” analysis as a basis for the citizens’ attitude towards the EU is partly just that – a myth, although one cannot exclude this possibility in connection with certain trades benefiting from EU funding.

*partie=titre “We don’t want more countries in the EU” *partie=nil

Reports from both the European Parliament and from the Dresdner Bank estimate that the enlargement will cost the EU between 40 and 44 billion euros a year if there is no reform of the structural funds and the common agriculture policy. Such reforms require some of the present EU countries to receive smaller sums from the EU budget. This means that in a few years from now, member states will receive less aid from the EU, a development that could be a new source of Euroscepticism.

Another argument against enlargement is the fear of low-skilled, low-wage workers from Eastern Europe taking over the jobs of the Western workers. The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) is convinced that in the medium term full integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the European internal market will greatly benefit the European economy and strengthen the competitive position of European business in world markets. However, it does not seem as if this argument has convinced a majority of the citizens of the present member states.

Enlargement of the EU is not among the top priorities of European citizens. Only 26% see enlargement as a priority for the EU and only 44% support enlargement. *{(see Figure 9.)}

A radical change is that the enlargement theme it is no longer a question of moral or emotional attitudes, but a question of rational considerations. *{9} For example those EU member states which share borders with a candidate country are more concerned about the possible immediate negative implications of accession. When asked about specific attitudes to enlargement, 50% answer, “Once new countries have joined the EU, our country will receive less financial aid from the Union”, and only 28% agree that “*{...} enlargement will not cost more to existing member countries like our country”. *{10}

*{9 Europarl Briefing nr. 41
10 Eurobarometer 54, April 2001}

Paradoxically, among the populations of Central and Eastern European countries, enthusiasm for the European Union is not overwhelming. In four of the applicant countries, support for EU-membership is less than 50% of the population. With 72% of the population supporting membership, Romania is the country with the highest support rate. The reason for the rather low support for EU membership could be the fact that enlargement is mainly a matter of interest to the political élite. *{11}

*{11 Europarl Briefing nr. 41}

The question of EU enlargement is not only about the economy but also about identity and community.

*partie=titre 2. 4 Cultural Arguments *partie=nil

*partie=titre “I don’t feel European” *partie=nil

Should a certain degree of common European identity be seen as a precondition to legitimise EU decision-making? If many decisions are to be made by supranational bodies and no longer by the national parliaments, do people need to feel some kind of common European identity, to feel they are a part of a common political community?

Over the years there have been many initiatives designed to encourage a common European identity. Symbols of common EU-identity have been created: European flag, EU-hymn, EU-day and common schoolbooks about European history. The Maastricht Treaty from 1992 introduced the concept of EU-citizenship, which among other things granted citizens of member-countries the right to vote in local, regional and European elections in any other member-country. Furthermore, in December, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights was endorsed by the EU-summit in Nice.

But none of the initiatives have succeeded - yet. People still do not feel more European. When asked if they feel national, European or a mix of these, an average of 38% answer that they only feel national, and during the last ten years this number has not decreased. *{(See Figure 10.)}

Well-educated people generally identify more strongly with Europe than the working class. *{12} They are used to travelling and communicating with other Europeans and they meet fewer language-barriers. So while the political EU-community may exist at élite-level, and especially on the political level, it is more or less non-existent in the public sphere. *{13}

*{12 S. Duchesne & A. Frognier, 1995.
13 A. Scheuer, 1999.}

Anyway, there is no direct relationship between declaring pride in ones nationality and considering oneself to have a European identity - in some countries this relationship is quite the opposite: national pride tends to foster the development of European identity. *{14} And in general, the lack of a European identity does not mean distrust towards other Europeans. The majority of EU citizens in general trust the people of other membercountries as much as they trust their own countrymen. *{15}

*{14 S. Duchesne & A. Frognier, 1995
15 A. Scheuer, 1999}

Some describe this European identity as not yet established,*{16} others claim it is impossible to reach, because it is bound to the attributes of ethnicity. *{17} But do people have to feel European to accept supranational decisions, or is it possible with a more limited common identity? Again, others claim that it is possible to separate ethnos from demos - to decouple nationality and citizenship. *{18} And it is thus possible to think of multiple national and European identities co-existing.

*{16 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht
17 D. Obradovic, 1996
18 J. H. H. Weiler, 1997}

In that case it will cause misunderstanding to create new EU-nationalistic symbols, as if they were to replace national symbols. It is instead possible to develop another kind of political and not cultural European identity. A way to create this political community could be to introduce a new kind of dialogue between Europeans, and between the general European public and the politicians.

*{In the following some guidelines for democratic dialogue will be introduced.}

*partie=titre 3. Democratic Dialogue – A Solution for Europe *partie=nil

*partie=titre 3.1 In Search of Solutions *partie=nil

“There is a real and urgent need to focus on how we make the union more meaningful to our citizens and on how its democratic accountability can be strengthened” *{19}

*{19 Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, following the Irish “no” to the Treaty of Nice}

Dealing with the causes of Euroscepticism is and will be one of the major challenges for Europe in the coming years. The Irish rejection of the Treaty of Nice is only the latest example of how serious this challenge is. The result in Ireland caught Europe by surprise, since the Irish had up until now been quite positive about European cooperation. It is not the first time that the political élite in Europe has seemed out of step with the population. The examples are numerous.

While there are many signs of - and complex facets to - Euroscepticism, as described in chapter 2, the solution is perhaps less clear. Things have begun to move, though. The need for public debate has been put on the agenda e.g. in the Treaty of Nice. But Europe has a long way to go to sufficiently address Euroscepticism.

Even though the Swedish Presidency initiated a dialogue with grass-root organizations at the latest EU-summit in Gothenburg, the summit will be remembered primarily for rioting, violence, injuries and even shooting in the streets. The Schengen-agreement was temporarily suspended by the Swedish authorities in favour of police control at the Swedish borders.

These recent events bring to mind some of the scenarios described by the European Commission’s Forward Studies Unit in 1999. One scenario pictures a Europe where a social revolution results in massive attacks on the EU-institutions. Another scenario describes a situation where citizens are actively taking part in policy-making. *{20} *{See also insert below.}

*{20 Forward Studies Unit, 1999}

Both scenarios present fairly radical images of a European future. Yet the latest riots illustrate that violent protests are in fact a possible risk-scenario for the EU. On the other hand, the scenarios offer some food for thought about the need for integrative democracy, where an active and open on-going dialogue with the people is a natural part of European cooperation.

The time has come to establish this dialogue before public protests, riots and violence escalate beyond control.

*partie=titre 3.2 A New Democratic Dimension *partie=nil

In many ways, European cooperation over the years has developed as a gigantic political experiment. Today, the European Union is a unique political system not found anywhere else in the world, and it is constantly evolving. Democracy should evolve with it.

The vision could be to make European cooperation the most advanced place for democratic experiments. Euroscepticism and the democratic deficit are not the only challenges. The need for action to cope with this challenge is also an opportunity to test new ground and “push the limits” on behalf of democracy.

The starting point could be to integrate new channels for democratic participation in Europe’s development in the coming years. But who knows? On a long-term perspective, entirely new forms of democracy that correspond with the globalized world of the 21st century might spring from the European scene, rather than grow from the “traditional” democracies of nation-states.

In essence, Europe must pursue a new democratic dimension. Not as an alternative to ongoing institutional reforms in EU, but as an important supplement, which adds to the development already taking place.

As the directly elected European Parliament has obtained more legislative power, the representative democratic dimension of the EU has evolved, strengthening the formal ties with voters. Time will show whether this will increase the public’s interest in the Parliament.

The fact that Euroscepticism prevails suggests that another democratic dimension needs much more attention. Strengthening democracy in the EU implies strengthening the integrative part of the European democracy, i.e. the part of democracy, which deals with dialogue and public involvement.

The democratic future of the European Union also depends on the ability of the EU institutions – be it the Commission, the Parliament, the Council or others – to be part of an active dialogue with the citizens of Europe.

*partie=titre 3.3 Guidelines for Democratic Dialogue *partie=nil

Faced with this challenge, it is important for us to consider carefully how to plan and realize initiatives that promote democratic dialogue in a way, which will actually make a difference. There is, of course, no foolproof formula. But the following guidelines offer valuable inspiration for new modes of thought, new methods and untraditional partnerships.

*partie=titre A) Building new partnerships *partie=nil

Today, the general public still perceives European politics as dominated by “élitist” institutions that primarily exists for the most influential actors in society: business, politicians, public authorities, and powerful interest organizations.

Therefore empowering citizens is essential. Other stakeholders in Europe must be involved in the dialogue in new forms of partnership, because they share an interest in and responsibility for developing a European “society”. These partnerships should include both the political institutions, business, NGOs, media and academia, who all play a role in European cooperation. *{(See also Insert.)}

*partie=titre B) From passive information to active communication *partie=nil

Often politicians and opinion-leaders point to the lack of information and knowledge about European politics as the primary reason for public scepticism. For any democracy to flourish, information and “enlightenment” are important elements. And EU politics are strained by lack of public knowledge, misinformation and hard-to-kill myths. 

However, as illustrated in chapter 2, Euroscepticism is not only about lack of information and knowledge, even though a more comprehensive effort in this area is certainly called for.

Information must be backed by active communication with and among citizens, and not only on special occasions like national referenda or summits where media attention is massive. From the early days of democracy in ancient Greece some 2500 years ago, the simple act of conversation and deliberation has been essential for making legitimate democratic decisions. And it should still be.

To make a difference in the long run, dialogue should be an ongoing process, a process, which makes European politics an everyday issue - just like domestic or local politics - not an issue reserved for special occasions.

Otherwise public debate on Europe will be less qualified and less focused on the actual issues. When the debate about the euro roared in Denmark before the national referendum in September 2000, a comprehensive survey of the debate in all the major news media showed that more than 50% of the debate was actually about - the debate, not the common currency itself or its potential impact on Danish society. *{21} This example suggests that public discourse still has a long way to go when it comes to European politics.

*{21 Mandag Morgen Weekly, no. 24, 2001.}

Two-way communication between the “élite” and the citizens, which can inspire the former and engage and empower the latter in the affairs of Europe, is a precondition for a stronger democracy in Europe. The European Commission and several member states have launched initiatives to support the dialogue, and the European Council decided in Gothenburg that every member state should monitor and report about their domestic EU-debate. This will help clarify, how much debate there is, as well as its focus and quality. However, there is a strong need for many more initiatives.

*partie=titre C) Putting citizens first *partie=nil

Since Euroscepticism is primarily found in the general public, it calls for solutions that are rooted in the needs and opinions of the people, not primarily based on the logic of decision-makers and political institutions. Dialogue is the first important step. Making citizens the focal point of attention for the dialogue is the next step.

Furthermore, there is an important distinction between debate and dialogue. They are not necessarily the same. Debate might turn into one-way communication, where participants try to win the final argument. It aims at conclusion. Dialogue searches for common ground between participants and is continuous. *{(See Figure 11.)}

The challenge is not so much creating a dialogue as making it appealing to people to participate. If dialogue initiatives are organized in a way which offers people much more than the opportunity to ask questions, if it gives them the “right of initiative”, the right to set the agenda, the result is likely to be that people feel empowered and develop an enhanced sense of responsibility for the issues that are up for discussion.

It is to make room for citizens’ values and beliefs as a guide for the direction of the dialogue, so that it focuses on issues that concern people, not only politicians.

This was the most important lesson learned form the first ever national Deliberative Poll in continental Europe - in Denmark in late August 2000 on the euro. See insert below.

*partie=titre D) Breaking new ground for democracy *partie=nil

The Danish Deliberative Poll was a democratic experiment, which combined representative democracy with deliberative democracy. It was a unique way of involving citizens in dialogue based on the “bottom-up principle”.

There is a whole range of tools and methods that could be employed to create a dialogue, which is both fruitful and has its primary emphasis on citizens.

New digital technology, especially the Web, represents a new means of communication that can inform about - and involve citizens in - politics. This mass medium is still so new that e-democracy is still in its developmental phase. Of course, not everyone has access, at least from home. But the percentage of Internet penetration in private households is rising rapidly and by the next EP-elections in 2004, Europeans will be much more “wired” than today. In a medium that has changed the worlds of communication and business in just five to six years, imagine what else can happen during the next three years.

Web technology is steadily making more impact on society - and will play a leading role in democracy in the near future.

This sophisticated technological channel for democracy did not exist just a few years ago. Today, many young people navigate cyberspace as easily as navigating their own neighbourhood. And the next generation will expect technology to be an integrated part of the democratic institutions their society builds on.

Therefore new experiments on the Web, like the new Futurum-portal recently launched by the Commission, are very important indeed for the development of a more democratic Europe.

*partie=titre 3.4 How to Bridge Europe – An Example *partie=nil

*partie=titre The Project *partie=nil

The need for action and dialogue has now been stressed. Europe needs to develop a new democratic dimension. One example of how the challenge of Euroscepticism could be met and new modes of dialogue initiated, is the planned joint venture between World Economic Forum and the House of Mandag Morgen.

The aim of the initiative is to promote democratic sustainability on the European continent and to ensure an updated understanding of what cooperation in the EU means and entails. The project focuses on developing the democratic dimension in Europe through more qualified dialogue between major stakeholders such as European citizens, businesses, political institutions, NGOs, media, and academia. A special effort will be made to communicate with young Europeans.

*partie=titre The Deliverables *partie=nil

The different milestones of the initiative will be highlighted at the World Economic Forum’s European Economic Summit in Salzburg and the Annual Meeting in Davos, and will include the following deliverables:

Voice of Europe: surveys of values and motives behind Euroscepticism and peoples' perception of the democratic deficit as well as other European issues. Qualitative analyses and extensive dialogue with up to 500 selected citizens on a People's Panel.

Next Generation Europe: building of a web-community of up to 1000 European young people. Initiates dialogue with and polling of the voters of the future.

Dialogue Lab: ongoing development of innovative and interactive methods and tools for democratic dialogue.